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The aim of this paper is to develop a potential relation between Pyrrhonism and 
existentialism. This is possible by establishing either an existentialist reconstruction of 
Pyrrhonism or a Pyrrhonian reconstruction of existentialism. The necessity of unveiling such 
a relation derives from: (1) the lack of an epistemological sceptical perspective and a 
normative ethical position within existentialism; (2) the lack of an accurate analysis of the 
human being within Pyrrhonism. However, the compatibility of the strong aspects inherent in 
both schools, the sceptical subjectivist arguments and the normative approach to morality 
inherent in Pyrrhonism and the analysis of the human being in relation to anxiety, potentiality, 
becoming, alienation, inauthenticity, authenticity and freedom inherent in existentialism, may 
show us a new way of looking into the universe and human life. 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to present a rather odd and unusual but hopefully original 
analysis on a potential relation between Pyrrhonism and existentialism. The way to do this is 
my proposal to establish either an existentialist reconstruction of Pyrrhonism or a Pyrrhonian 
reconstruction of existentialism. The necessity of unveiling such a relation derives from the 
lack of an epistemological sceptical perspective and a normative ethical position within 
existentialism as well as from the lack of an accurate analysis of the human being within 
Pyrrhonism; and the hope that the compatibility of the strong aspects inherent in both schools 
may show us a new way of looking into the universe and human life. 
Understanding this perspective obviously requires an analysis of Pyrrhonism and 
existentialism; as well as a comparison between them. 
Pyrrhonism is an Ancient Greek sceptical philosophical school founded by Pyrrho of  
Elis. His most prominent followers were Timon, Aenesedimus, Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus 
and their main targets were Plato, Aristotle, Zeno (of Citium), Epicurus and their followers. 
Pyrrho, like Socrates, never wrote anything. The writings of Timon, Aenesedimus and 
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Agrippa are lost and do not exist anymore. The only writings by Pyrrhonian philosophers 
which survived and are available at present are those of Sextus Empiricus. This makes Sextus 
Empiricus the most important source of what is known today as Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
When we analyze Pyrrhonian scepticism as expressed in the texts of Sextus Empiricus, 
particularly in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians (consisting of 
Against the Logicians, Against the Physicists and Against the Ethicists), we see an 
abolishment of the duality between appearance and reality, in the sense that the only thing one 
can be certain of are appearances (phainomena). The sceptic has no doubt about the 
appearances but only a doubt about a so called reality; or rather a doubt about how things are 
in themselves; how things are by nature, independent of the human mind.1 So the Pyrrhonian 
sceptic suspends judgement (epoche) both as to whether things are as they appear to us and as 
to whether things are not as they appear to us. 
Appearances in Sextus’s texts can both be about sensation and about thought. In other 
words things appear to our sense perceptions and to our thought and what appears to our sense 
perceptions and to our thought may differ among different human beings. Appearances are 
relative.2 However this does not mean that the Pyrrhonian sceptic raises doubt about the 
appearance itself. On the contrary, he gives assent to things, he grants things, he raises no 
doubt about things, as long as they are in accordance with the appearances. Therefore, when 
the Pyrrhonian sceptic talks about uttering things without belief (adoxastos), he talks about 
specific beliefs, not all beliefs, he talks about dogmatic beliefs which transcend the 
appearances and the limits of the human mind; when the Pyrrhonian sceptic talks about 
suspending judgement, he talks about specific judgements, not all judgements, he talks about 
dogmatic judgements which transcend the appearances and the limits of the human mind. 
To categorize the statement “X is Y in itself, by nature” as one representative of belief 
and judgement; and to categorize the statement “X appears Y” not as one representative of 
belief and judgement is obviously absurd. These two statements differ in structure but both 
statements represent a belief and a judgement. There is no reason to disqualify a statement 
                                                          
1
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 1, Section 7-8, 10-11, 14, 20 
2
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 1, Section 14 
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about an appearance as representative of belief and judgement.3 The English terms belief and 
judgement simply do not correspond to the Greek term doxa in the context of Sextus’s texts.     
For example, the sceptic does not raise any doubt about the fact that honey appears 
sweet to a particular person if it does so; however he would raise a doubt about whether honey 
is sweet in itself, by nature. Similarly, in the field of morality, actions and choices appear 
good or bad to different individuals or different societies; the sceptic does not raise any doubt 
about the appearance itself, but he does raise doubt about whether actions and choices are 
                                                          
3
 This interpretation of mine is clearly in opposition to the interpretations of Myles Burnyeat, Benson 
Mates, Michael Williams, Christopher Hookway and Julia Annas. (Myles Burnyeat, The Sceptical 
Tradition, pg. 119-122; Benson Mates, The Sceptic Way, pg. Vii; Michael Williams, Scepticism, pg. 
553; Christopher Hookway, Scepticism, pg. İx and pg. 2; Julia Annas, Hume and Ancient Scepticism, 
pg. 273 and pg. 279-280). It is also in opposition to Julia Annas’s and Jonathan Barnes’s translation of 
adoxastos as “without holding any opinions” and Benson Mates’s translation of the same concept as 
“without belief”. (Outlines of Scepticism translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes; The Sceptic 
Way. Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism translated with an introduction and commentary by 
Benson Mates). Burnyeat does seem to be aware of this objection (The Sceptical Tradition pg. 133-
134) but in the end states that there can not be a belief without assuming a concept of truth; Hookway 
also aware of the same objection presents a similar attitude presenting truth as a necessary 
precondition of belief (Scepticism, pg. 15.). Mates also mentions a counter position to his own saying 
that the English term belief may have different meanings and that doxa refers to something more 
specific about the external world but in the end he insists on translating adoxastos as “without belief” 
(The Sceptic Way, pg. 60). Williams raises the possibility of a similar objection saying that according 
to some passages in Sextus the scope of epoche might be seen as limited but in the end concludes that 
Sextus’ scepticism is devoid of a theoretical basis in epistemology (Scepticism, pg. 56). Annas does 
say that the Pyrrhonian sceptic way is compatible with action according to appearances (Hume and 
Ancient Scepticism, pg. 275) and that doxa is more tied to truth and rational support (Hume and 
Ancient Scepticism, pg. 283). However this is in contradiction to what she says in the same article 
when she claims that the Pyrrhonian sceptic has no position, no position of his own and makes no 
assertion (Hume and Ancient Scepticism, pg. 273, pg. 279-280) and also in contradiction with her 
translation of the concept of adoxastos as “without holding any opinions”. I think a more accurate and 
consistent interpretation then those of Burnyeat, Mates, Williams, Hookway and Annas is presented by 
Gisela Striker, Arne Naess and Nicholas Rescher. (Gisela Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology 
and Ethics, pg. 142-145; Arne Naess, Scepticism, pg. 47-48; Nicholas Rescher, Scepticism, pg. 29 and 
pg. 215-216). My interpretation has an intersecting aspect with that of Striker, Naess and Rescher. The 
translation of R.G. Bury and Sanford G. Etheridge are also more reflective of Sextus in this aspect 
when compared to Annas, Barnes and Mates. R.G. Bury translates adoxastos as “undogmatically” and 
Etheridge either as “undogmatically” or as “without prejudice” (Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism translated by R.G. Bury; Hallie, Philip P. –Editor- & Sanford G. Etheridge –Translator-, 
Scepticism, Man and God). My proposal is that we can also translate adoxastos as “without beliefs of 
dogma”, “without dogmatic belief”, “without belief in dogma” or “without dogmatic opinion” (Örsan 
K. Öymen, Sextus Empiricus’ Problem of Criterion, PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 
pg 81; Sekstus Empirikus’un ‘Pironizmin Ana Hatları’ Eserinden Bölümlerin Çevirisi Üzerine, pg. 
77).  
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good or bad by nature, in themselves, independent of the appearance; he does raise doubt 
about whether the action and choice is representative of an objective and / or universal moral 
principle, judgement and reality. Judgements about moral issues, about what is good and bad, 
for example about death, prostitution, incest, masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse 
in public may differ among Greeks and also among different cultures and societies, such as 
the Greeks, the Persians, the Egyptians and the Indians. There are no objective and / or 
universal moral realities.4  
The only thing we have are the relative appearances which vary among different 
animals and human beings. Things appear to our sensations and also to our thought; but to 
establish a connection or disconnection, a correspondence or noncorrespondence between 
appearance and reality can not be justified; such an attempt can only be a dogmatic one; such 
an attempt would be the attempt of a dogmatist. A suspense of judgement is necessary both 
about the essential properties of physical objects, about how things are by nature, how things 
are in themselves; and also about objective and / or universal moral values, about things good 
and bad by nature.  
The only way to solve this problem of relativity and establish something in the name 
of reality would be to establish a criterion of truth, which through a proof would enable us to 
distinguish between true and false and make a selection from the varying relative 
appearances. However due to the problems of circularity and infinite regress that does not 
seem possible as well.5 To justify a proof with a criterion and a criterion with a proof will lead 
us into a circular reasoning. To justify a criterion with another criterion or a proof with 
another proof will lead us into an infinite regress; because each criterion or each proof would 
itself be in need of a criterion or proof. Basic self-evident assumptions which are immune 
from a criterion or proof do not seem possible either; if such assumptions would be the case 
there would not be a relativity among appearances in sensation and thought. 
Therefore one must suspend judgement as to anything which goes beyond our 
appearances, which transcend our appearances. Philosophers who try to establish a realm, a 
                                                          
4
  Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 3, Section 22-24; Against The Ethicists,  Section 1, 
3-4 
5
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 1, Section 14-16, Book 2, Section 3-7 
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dimension, a world beyond appearance are dogmatist philosophers. The claim of the 
Pyrrhonian sceptics is not a dogmatist claim because it is satisfied with mere appearances and 
raises doubt about so called realities. The Pyrrhonian thesis is also not self refuting because 
the sceptic arguments are only an expression of the sceptic mind; they do not have a claim for 
objectivity and truth; the arguments are only representative of what appears at the moment to 
the sceptic mind. The Pyrrhonian thesis has a subjective character.6 
So far so good, as long as we share a sceptical relativistic perspective both in 
epistemology and in ethics.The problem starts in the sphere of morality with happiness 
(eudaimonia) as the tranquility of the soul (ataraxia). Sextus claims that the suspense of 
judgement which is a consequence of subjectivity enables the sceptic to reach the tranquility 
of the soul. The tranquility of the soul is the goal of the sceptic and of course also the 
consequence of the suspense of judgement as to moral issues, as to what is good and bad by 
nature.7 So the goal is reached by the suspense of judgement. One does not suspend 
judgement in order to reach the goal but sceptical arguments lead the sceptic into a suspense 
of judgement which brings about the tranquility of the soul. The question is: Why should 
anyone be more tranquil if he is in a tentative state of agnosticism as to external realities? The 
Pyrrhonian response is: Because if one is convinced that he holds a belief as to what is good 
and bad by nature, as to what is objectively and/or universally good and bad, he will hold on 
to that belief so intensely that he will be in a fear of losing this belief; if one intensely pursues 
to hold a belief as to what is good and bad by nature, as to what is objectively and/or 
universally good and bad because he believes that there is such a thing but is not convinced 
that he holds such a belief, he will be frustrated and dissappointed and will also think that he 
is tormented by things that are by nature bad. In any case his soul will be in a state of 
disturbance and trouble (tarache), not in a state of tranquility. But the sceptic who suspends 
judgement will only experience certain minor unavoidable troubles such as thirst and hunger 
and even regarding such unavoidable troubles he will escape them more mildly because he 
                                                          
6
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 1, Section 1, 19-28 
7
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 1, Section 4, 12, Book 3, Section 24; Against the 
Ethicists, Section 4-5 
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will not hold a belief that they are bad by nature. Regarding avoidable issues, he will 
eliminate trouble as a whole. 
Obviously why should someone who is convinced that he holds a belief as to what is 
good and bad by nature, as to what is objectively and/or universally good and bad, necessarily 
be in a fear of losing this belief? On the contrary he may be very confident that he will never 
lose this belief or this so called apprehension of what really is the case objectively and/or 
universally. Similarly why should someone who intensely pursues to hold a belief as to what 
is good and bad by nature, as to what is objectively and/or universally good and bad but is not 
convinced that he holds such a belief, necessarily be frustrated and dissappointed? On the 
contrary he may pursue such absolute realities without ever feeling frustrated and 
dissappointed, feeling tranquil and/or happy within the struggle, for the sake of the struggle 
towards the unattainable or towards something which may be attained one day. 
The problem is whether Sextus means that all human beings who suspend judgement 
will be in a state of tranquility. If it is only particular Pyrrhonian sceptics, such as Pyrrho 
himself and his followers such as Timon, Aenesedimus, Agrippa and Sextus himself, that is 
fine, then we may say that Sextus is only describing the state of  particular Pyrrhonian 
sceptics. But if he means that all human beings who agree with the Pyrrhonian sceptical 
arguments will necessarily be in a state of tranquility, that would be a gross generalization and 
also be in conflict with his own phenomenalistic subjectivist perspective. This would also be 
in contradiction with what he says on induction. Sextus says that inductive inferences are 
shaky because in such an inference the universal conclusion is derived from limited 
particulars; since particulars are boundless and one can not consume all particulars and one 
particular may be in conflict with the universal, inductive inferences can never be considered 
reliable.8 So to make an inductive generalization about the human being or human soul would 
also be in contradiction with his own view on induction. Sextus never makes it very clear 
whether he makes an inductive generalization about the human soul or whether he limits his 
conclusion about the transition from the suspense of judgement to the tranquility of the soul to 
particular sceptical philosophers.  
                                                          
8
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 2, Section 15 
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Factually it is very clear that not all sceptics who agree with the Pyrrhonian arguments 
would necessarily be in a state of tranquility, on the contrary, many would be in a state of 
disturbance and anxiety. But in any case even if we assume that he does not make such a 
generalization as a fact one could still question the Pyrrhonian goal of tranquility, one could 
question why we ought to accept such a goal in life and whether such a goal is compatible 
with a more accurate analysis of the being of the human being.  
The question and problem is: Why tranquility? Why not anxiety? Why pleasure? Why 
not pain? Why happiness? Why not unhappiness? Human reality seems to cover a variety of 
feelings and can not be reduced either as a fact or as a goal to one particular feeling such as 
tranquility, pleasure, happiness or their opposites.   
The existentialism of the 19th and 20th centuries is a striking example and a serious 
challenge to Ancient Greek ethics. The theories of Friedrich Nietzsche, Soren Kierkegaard, 
Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre suggest a completely 
different understanding of life and the human being. Obviously there are some important 
differences among these philosophers and it is debatable whether we could categorize and 
generalize these philosophers under the title existentialism. As a matter of fact it is mostly 
Sartre who uses the term existentialism to describe his ontology. However there are particular 
similarities and intersecting points among these philosophers which may enable us to use the 
term existentialism to describe a particular perspective derived from their ideas.9 When I say 
existentialism in this paper, I do not refer to the theories of these philosophers as a whole.  
Besides significant differences, the essential common points among these philosophers 
can be summarized as follows:10  
                                                          
9
 There are scholars who share this opinion and conduct research from this perspective. Six 
Existentialist Thinkers by H.J. Blackham and Existentialism by David Cooper are two significant 
works which were written in this framework. 
10
 My analysis is not identical to that of Blackham and Cooper but has some similarities. The points I 
present are expressed in various forms at numerous passages in the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, 
Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger and Sartre; particularly in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, The Present Age, The Sickness Unto Death, The Concept of Anxiety, Fear and Trembling; 
in Nietzsche’s Human All Too Human, Beyond Good and Evil, The Gay Science, The Genealogy of 
Morality, Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ; in Heidegger’s Being and Time, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics; in Jaspers’ The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, Philosophy of Existence, Reason and 
Exiztenz, Philosophy; in Marcel’s Being and Having, The Mystery of Being, The Existential 
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1) The prior task of philosophy should be to present an analysis of the being of the human 
being.  
2) Subjectivity is the essential characteristic of the human being; the human being can not be 
understood as a whole in purely objective terms. 
3) The human being is always in a state of becoming, a potentiality, through choice and 
action, not in a state of being as a fixed, stable, changeless creature. 
4) The feeling of anxiety and/or anguish and/or metaphysical fear and/or spiritual pain is an 
essential aspect of the human being. 
5) Alienation and inauthenticity are as much part of life as authenticity. 
These are also the main and basic principles of what I call existentialism and they need 
not to be identified with other definitions of existentialism. The first and second points do not 
pose a serious threat to Pyrrhonism; they are even compatible with it. But the third, fourth and 
fifth points stand as something incompatible with the Pyrrhonian view on the tranquility of 
the soul as the goal of life and as the consequence of the suspense of judgement on moral 
issues. These latter points obviously are also not compatible with any type of eudaimonism 
and/or hedonism in Ancient Greek philosophy; existentialism is not only a threat to 
Pyrrhonism but also a threat to Plato, Aristotle, Zeno (of Citium) and Epicurus. (I believe the 
first and second points, depending on our interpretation, may also pose a challenge to these 
philosophers.) 
One may make a distinction between is and ought and say that the goal in Ancient 
Greek ethics is always about an ought, about the normative aspect of moral philosophy, about 
an ideal, not about a factual description of how things are. This is correct and it is also correct 
that existentialism often makes no normative statement, it usually does not set a moral goal 
for life; that is definately the case in Heidegger’s Being and Time and Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness. What they do here is to present a phenomenological and ontological description 
of the being of the human being; of what it means to be a human being; of what it is to be a 
human being. But the question is, how can one set a moral goal, as it is the case in Ancient 
Greek philosophy and also in Pyrrhonism, without an accurate description and analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Background of Human Dignity, The Philosophy of Existentialism; and in Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness, Existentialism is a Humanism.     
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being of the human being; of what it means to be a human being; of what it is to be a human 
being? How can one develop an ought without having an accurate grasp of what is? In this 
case, isn’t eudaimonism and also hedonism (regardless of whether they are in contrast to each 
other or not) just an artificial and fake goal, something never to be attained, something 
representing a wishfull thinking, something incompatible with human nature? 
The human being is always in a state of becoming, not in a state of being as a fixed, 
stable, changeless creature; he is always a potentiality, he is always something he is not yet, 
always with an intention and projection towards the future, seperated from something fixed, 
stable and changeless by a nothingness.11 Thus from an existentialist perspective it makes no 
sense to talk about some fixed goal and state such as happiness or pleasure or tranquility. 
Furthermore, anxiety and/or anguish is part of the human condition as a result of this 
potentiality and neither anxiety nor anguish are compatible with happiness, pleasure and 
tranquility. The disturbed and troubled state of the soul which the Pyrrhonians talk about may 
not be identical to what the existentialists call anxiety and anguish; similarly the feeling of 
pain in Pyrrhonism or in Ancient philosophy in general may not be identical to anxiety and 
anguish either; the Ancient Greek terms seem to refer to something more general and the 
existentialist terms to something more specific, such as in Heidegger when he establishes a 
relationship between being-towards-death (sein-zum-tode) and anxiety (angst). Furthermore 
the existentialists distinguish between fear and anxiety; they say, anxiety, unlike fear, has no 
object; one can fear something but not feel anxiety about something concrete and particular; 
the Pyrrhonians on the other hand, like the Epicureans, seem to include the feeling of fear 
within a troubled and disturbed state of the soul. But eventually we may easily say that the 
existentialist terms anxiety and anguish do not represent a tranquil state of the soul either; 
they do represent some sort of disturbance and trouble even if not related to other feelings 
which can also be categorized under a troubled and disturbed state of the soul. Finally, 
alienation, both in the sense of losing authenticity and in the sense of losing freedom or the 
consciousness of freedom is another part of the human condition. It is debatable whether a 
person can be considered to be happy or to feel pleasure or to be tranquil when he is in a state 
                                                          
11
 Martin Heidegger: Being and Time, Part 1, Division 1, Chapter 1, Section 9-11; Part 1, Division 2, 
Chapter 1, Section 46-53; Jean-Paul Sartre: Being and Nothingness, Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 5 
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of alienation and inauthenticity. How can a person be happy or feel pleasure or be tranquil if 
he is detached from himself, from his distinctive individual characteristics, if he loses his 
identity in public, in the masses, in the others, if he escapes from his freedom, if he becomes 
anonymous, mediocre and ordinary, if he can not create his own values?  
One objection may be that the Pyrrhonians as well as the Ancient Greek philosophers 
in general did not have to deal with such concepts as anxiety, anguish, alienation and 
authenticity; simply because they never experienced such states in their soul; that such 
feelings are only part of the modern man and the modern world. I have strong doubts about 
this view. It is correct that such terms and themes became more a part of the philosophical 
scene in the 19th and 20th centuries; but that does not mean that those feelings and states of 
the soul never existed before among human beings. It is highly possible that they did exist in 
Ancient Greece as well; that the same human conditions were present at that time as well; that 
the obsessive search for happiness, pleasure and tranquility was probably a consciouss or 
unconsciouss consequence of the presence of those conditions as well. 
Based on the same reasons, establishing a goal towards happiness, pleasure and 
tranquility should not be seen as a surprise; but again, the question is, how natural, how 
realistic would such an attempt be? If such attempts are incompatible with human nature, 
wouldn’t it be more disappointing for a human being to set such a goal and never achieve it? 
How happy and how tranquil can a person be if he sets a goal which is unattainable, which is 
against human nature, against the natural human condition? The struggle to overcome 
alienation and inauthenticity is obviously among the most admirable and honourable things in 
the history of humanity and this struggle should obviously be preserved as long as humanity 
exists; but the obsession to transcend our fears, pains and anxieties is not only artificial and 
unnatural but is also against the spirit of a struggle to overcome alienation and inauthenticity. 
Fear, pain and anxiety is an essential part of this struggle, the person who has a concern for 
freedom must necessarily be in a state of fear, pain and anxiety, at least occasionally or 
frequently, if not on a continious basis. 
Another crucial aspect is the effect of the sceptical epistemic condition on the human 
soul and his psychological state. Not being able to know what is going on out there in the 
external world at an objective and/or universal level, on the contrary only being aware and 
consciouss of our appearances, may cause more anxiety and anguish than tranquility or peace 
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of the soul. Not being able to know how things are in themselves independent of the mind, not 
being able to know what is morally good and bad independent of our personal subjective 
convictions, not being able to know the future due to the problem of induction, not being able 
to know whether there is a God or not12 can terrify most people and make them more anxious. 
How can ambiguity and uncertainty be a source of tranquility? Why should it be? Why 
tranquility? Why not anxiety? 
One alternative is to defeat the sceptical arguments stated by the Pyrrhonians. As a 
matter of fact many philosophers made that attempt. But how successfull have they been? 
Isn’t that artificial as well? Aristotle stated in his work titled Metaphysics that all human 
beings have a natural tendency to understand, to know; but the Pyrrhonian arguments shows 
us that understanding and knowing has its limits as well; that one can not transcend his 
appearances. (If  both Aristotle and the Pyrrhonians are correct in this particular point, the 
result can be considered as the tragedy of the human being). The 18th century philosopher 
David Hume was one of the few philosophers who saw and accepted the force of the 
Pyrrhonian arguments. He thought that only passion, natural instinct and the feeling of belief 
can save us from the force of Pyrrhonian arguments; the struggle against Pyrrhonian 
epistemology and ethics through pure reason and rational argumentation, as it has been the 
case with most rationalist philosophers, is a lost battle.13 Nietzsche was also one of the few 
philosophers to agree with scepticism in general and also with Pyrrhonian scepticism in 
particular; particularly with its challenge against the artificial duality created between 
appearance and reality, with its arguments against a criterion of truth; declaring Pyrrho as the 
only original philosopher after the Pre-Socratics to protest against the doctrines of Plato; 
declaring the Ancient Sceptics as the only honourable type in the history of philosophy.14   
Aside from Hume and Nietzsche, I do agree with the sceptical arguments of the 
Pyrrhonians. There is no need and no convincing way to challenge the epistemological aspect 
                                                          
12
 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 3, Section 2-3 
13
 David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter 12 
14
 Friedrich Nietzsche: Ecce Homo, Part 3; Anti-Christ, Section 12 and 54; The Gay Science, Section 
110, 354; Genealogy of Morality, Preface, Section 3; Human All Too Human, Section 21; Will To 
Power, Section 437; On Truth and Lies in A Nonmoral Sense; Twilight of the Idols, The Problem of 
Socrates, Section 2,4,10, ‘Reason’ in Philosophy, Section 6, 19; Beyond Good and Evil, Section 34 
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of Pyrrhonism, particularly the problem of infinite regress. The problem is not the scepticism 
inherent in their epistemology; the problem is not the epoche; the problem is with the concept 
of ataraxia, with the telos and the so called consequence of epoche. Existentialism poses an 
important challenge to that aspect and Pyrrhonism can make use of that aspect without 
demolishing itself as a whole. This may be seen as a process of evolution throughout time. If 
it wants to survive, it must adapt and reconstruct itself. 
So must existentialism. Pyrrhonism and existentialism need each other. Pyrrhonism 
needs to give up the concept of ataraxia and replace it with tarache as anxiety; not as a telos 
but as a mere consequence of epoche. Existentialism on the other hand needs a sceptical 
epistemological backbone, not a so called vague phenomenological and ontological 
explanation. Existentialism needs to replace Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology with 
Pyrrhonian phenomenalism and it needs to supplement its ontology with a sceptical 
epistemology. For who? Of course for the existentialist Pyrrhonians and Pyrrhonian 
existentialists only. Because the problem of induction in relation to human nature remains 
unsolved. If the tranquility of the soul is only valid for particular Pyrrhonian sceptics and if it 
is not a generalization, if it is only a description of a psychological state of particular people 
and does not include an inference from particulars to a universal, that is fine. But if the 
tranquility of the soul is presented as a necessary consequence of the suspense of judgement 
for all people, that is definately not a very convincing analysis about the human being. Neither 
is anxiety a necessary consequence of doubt for all people.  
An existential analysis of the human being shows us that the human being is a being 
which chooses and acts. As the famous existentialist saying goes, existence preceeds essence; 
there is no fixed human nature; man defines himself with his acts and choices; man is 
condemned to freedom; he is always in a state of choice with an intention and a project 
towards the future.15That is correct but it is also clear that existentialism generally lacks a 
morality, an ethics with a normative aspect, an ethics with a goal. Existentialism does not only 
lack an epistemology but usually also a normative ethics, at least in particular major works 
such as Being and Time and Being and Nothingness. The overcoming of alienation and 
                                                          
15
 Martin Heidegger: Being and Time, Part 1, Division 1, Chapter 6, Section 40; Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Being and Nothingness, Part 4, Chapter 1, Section 1-3; Existentialism is a Humanism 
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inauthenticity is rarely presented as a moral goal. Pyrrhonism has a moral goal, namely the 
tranquility of the soul, but it is a weak and fake goal; existentialism usually has no goal at all, 
at least not in early Heidegger and Sartre, it is just worried with a descriptive aspect, with the 
is, not with the ought. Therefore, an existentialist reconstruction of Pyrrhonism or a 
Pyrrhonian reconstruction of existentialism or if we may say so a synthesis between 
existentialism and Pyrrhonism also needs the establishment of a moral goal. This goal is 
neither happiness nor unhappiness, neither pleasure nor pain, neither tranquility nor 
disturbance. The goal is simply freedom in the sense of overcoming alienation and 
inauthenticity. As Sartre says, man is condemned to freedom in the sense that he is always in 
a state of choice with an intention and a projection towards the future; but that is not enough 
to explain freedom in another sense; the choice needs to be an authentic and non-alienated 
choice, not just any choice. To supplement this with an aspect in Nietzsche, who is actually 
not a nihilist as many scholars assume, the goal is freedom in the framework of a worldly, life 
affirming spirit, with an ability to create our own personal values, without any need to invent 
universalistic and/or objectivistic moral truths, without any need to invent metaphysical 
and/or religious other worlds, without any need to invent a life beyond this life we are living 
in; without negating life; this life being a life of happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and 
pain, tranquility and disturbance.16 The existence of all these conditions is a precondition for 
the possibility of a struggle for freedom. The quest for freedom is necessary because of our 
awareness of unhappiness, pain and disturbance due to the occasional existence of their 
opposites; or vice versa, the quest for freedom is necessary because of our awareness of 
happiness, pleasure and tranquility due to the occasional existence of their opposites. Whether 
freedom does produce happiness, pleasure or tranquility is not relevant at this stage and one 
may never know if it will produce happiness, pleasure or tranquility in each person. 
                                                          
16
 Friedrich Nietzsche: Twilight of the Idols, The Problem of Socrates, Section 4, ‘Reason’ in 
Philosophy, Section 1, 6, Morality as Anti-Nature, Section 1,4, The Four Great Errors, Section 8, 
What I Owe To the Ancients, Section 2; Beyond Good and Evil, Preface, Section 62, 168, 202, 203, 
269; Human All Too Human, Section 114, 115, 125, 129, 132, 141, 150, 225, 261; On the Genealogy 
of Morality, Second Essay, Section 24, Third Essay, Section 17; Anti-Christ, Section 7-9, 18, 51-52, 
55.  
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Regardless of whether freedom will produce happiness, pleasure and tranquility, is it 
possible to achieve such a goal? Is freedom as an absolute elimination of alienation and 
inauthenticity a possibility? As a good sceptic we can never know that for sure either. But the 
struggle for freedom is itself an important and attractive value because this struggle is the only 
thing in life which raises a consciousness of the potentiality of the human being. The point is 
not to reach the summit, but rather to do the climbing, to experience the process. Both 
Pyrrhonism and existentialism can offer us a lot towards that direction.  
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